"Seismic gap area"
 A huge tsunami was generated due to a large slip, more than 56m, near the Japan Trench.
 Multi-segment rupture including "seismic gap area (no seismic record) "
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 Due to rupture of the bonded interface, the North America Plate recoiled and the strain energy was released, which generated the huge tsunami. Lack of "Defense-in-Depth" against external hazards  Large scale "common cause failures (CCFs)" by external hazards should have been prevented/mitigated.
 We should have been prepared for "Low frequency, high consequence events" beyond design basis.
 Actually, the Defense-in-Depth (DiD) had not been taken into consideration for external events.
 Watertight doors were not implemented, Seawater pumps were not protected. AM measures were not effective, …  Training / drills assuming external events had not been conducted.  DiD has been and will continue to be an effective way to account for uncertainties.
 Effective independence between different layers of defense  More "diversity" and "independence" rather than "redundancy" "Tsunami risk had been recognized":
Lack of Agility  The Seismic Design Review Guide was revised in 2006 and a requirement was newly introduced against tsunami. So-called "backcheck" was in progress, but its progress was very slow.
 "Uncertainty allows for wishful thinking" + "Safety myth"  Lack of agility, lack of safety culture Diet Report  As the regulatory agency was aware of TEPCO's delaying of countermeasures, but did not follow up with any specific instructions. Nor did they properly supervise the back-check progress.
 When new findings indicate the possibility of a tsunami exceeding previous assumptions, the operator is required to quickly implement countermeasures, rather than taking time to clarify the scientific basis for that possibility through studies of sediment .... Message from Chairman  … this was a disaster "Made in Japan." Its fundamental causes are to be found in the … Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; … and our insularity. Organizational issues …  … actual relationship lacked independence and transparency, … In fact, it was a typical example of "regulatory capture," … Lack of expertise  … the two incorporated technical agencies advising NISA, namely, JNES and JAEA, have been too rigidly tied to NISA …. Conclusions  … The lack of expertise resulted in "regulatory capture,"… They avoided their direct responsibilities by letting operators apply regulations on a voluntary basis.
Regulatory Aspects: "Regulatory Capture" Pointed out in the Diet's Report Diet's Report (July 2012)
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"Myth of Safety"  … a fundamental problem of the inability to capture such crises as a reality that could happen in our lives; this, in turn, is the result of a myth of safety that existed among nuclear operators including TEPCO as well as the government, that serious severe accidents could never occur in NPPs in Japan.
"Basic Assumption" in the IAEA DG Report  Because of the basic assumption that NPPs in Japan were safe, there was a tendency for organizations and their staff not to challenge the level of safety.  The reinforced basic assumption among the stakeholders about the robustness of the technical design of NPPs resulted in a situation where safety improvements were not introduced promptly.
Human / Organizational Aspects: "Myth of Safety" Pointed Out in the Government's Report
Final Report from Government's Investigation Committee (July 2012)
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"Complacency" together with "Bureaucracy" allowed "Safety myth" to prevail, having let "Continuous improvement" cease. Nuclear regulation and nuclear promotion were clearly separated, and the NRA was established as an independent commission body defined by law* affiliated with MOE (Minister of Environment).
Safety myth prevailed

 Integrated
Nuclear regulation functions regarding safety, security, safeguards, radiation monitoring and radioisotopes were integrated into the NRA. 
Summary
 One of the most important lessons learned is "Lack of Defense-in-Depth against external hazards". We need to continuously enhance DiD since DiD has been and will continue to be an effective way to account for uncertainties.
 We need to keep reminding that "Complacency" together with "Bureaucracy" allowed "Safety myth" to prevail, having let "Continuous improvement" cease.
 Commissioner Fuketa of NRA stated in the OECD/NEA SC Workshop*:
 We, however, acknowledge we are oblivious. Numerous sprouts of safety myth reappear already.
 We must incorporate lessons-learned into the "institutional memory" of the NRA. We must create an environment where a gene letting us think "safety first" can survive. 
